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 The financial crisis that struck most of the world’s advanced industrialized economies 
during 2007-9 has presented a major challenge for economists concerned with economic 
fluctuations, and especially for those interested in the workings of monetary policy.  By many 
measures the crisis constituted the most significant macroeconomic event since World War II.  
Further, the origin of these events (as the label suggests) was squarely in the financial sector, and 
the policy actions that governments in many countries took in response, first during the crisis and 
then in the post-crisis recovery effort, importantly involved monetary policy.  Yet the models of 
monetary policy now commonly in use, both for teaching students in the field and for supporting 
policymaking within central banks, are not only incapable of incorporating the most widely 
accepted accounts of how this episode occurred but incapable too of analyzing the actions that 
monetary policymakers took.  The gap between the models and the world of monetary 
policymaking is now wider than at any time since the 1930s. 
                                                            
* This paper was prepared for the session on “After the Crisis: What Did We Learn, and What 
Should We Teach, about Monetary Policy?” sponsored by the AEA Committee on Economic 
Education, at the AEA meetings in San Diego, January 5, 2013.  I am grateful to numerous 
colleagues, and especially Kenneth Kuttner, for helpful conversations. 
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 The events triggered by the 2007-9 crisis have proved to be one of the most significant 
economic phenomena observed among the high-income economies in decades.  In many 
countries the costs of the downturn – costs in terms of reduced production, lost jobs, shrunken 
investment, and foregone incomes and profits – exceeded that of any previous post-World War II 
decline.  In most of these countries, the recovery from this downturn remained far from complete 
as of yearend 2012.  And, much more so than in most economic fluctuations, not only did 
financial developments trigger the downturn but once events were in progress it was in the 
financial sector that this episode especially stood out.  The collapse of major financial 
institutions, the decline in asset values and consequent destruction of paper wealth, the 
interruption of credit flows, the loss of confidence both in firms and in credit market instruments, 
and the fear of default by counterparties, were all extraordinary.  Above all, the aggressive 
intervention during the crisis by governments, importantly including central banks, charted new 
ground both in scale and in scope.  In most of the worst-affected countries, the focus of the post-
crisis recovery effort has been (and at the time of writing remains) largely on monetary policy. 
 For economists, however – and especially for macroeconomists, and even more so for 
those whose interest centers on monetary policy – the consequence of these events has been a 
crisis of a different kind.  The analytical models that have become standard in the field over the 
last generation are not only incapable of explaining what happened during this unusually 
significant episode, but unsuited even to incorporating most of the now widely accepted accounts 
of it.  Today’s standard macro-models, whether found in undergraduate textbooks or in use in 
graduate-level macroeconomics instruction, typically include no financial-sector variables other 
than a short-term interest rate and (perhaps) the quantity of “money,” and no way for what 
happens in the financial arena to affect nonfinancial economic activity other than via the interest 
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rate’s role in inter-temporal consumer choice (and perhaps an influence of real money balances, 
also on consumption).  The larger empirical models used by many central banks have more 
expanded detail, and make explicit a variety of real and nominal rigidities, but still the basic 
mechanism is the same.1  Neither offer any way to understand why the failure of a firm like 
Lehman Brothers, in September 2008, would have had a meaningful effect on the economy, or 
why it mattered that governments in the United States and elsewhere acted vigorously to prevent 
other firms from failing.  Nor do these models offer any explanation of why or how the unusual 
actions that central banks took – establishing special lending facilities for banks, purchasing 
targeted securities like commercial paper and residential mortgages, providing forward guidance 
on the policy interest rate – would have had any effect.  According to the models, once the 
central bank’s policy interest rate reached the practical lower bound of zero, monetary policy 
simply had no further role to play. 
 The response to these real-world events on the part of economists engaged with frontier 
research has presented yet a further challenge, to them as well as to students of the discipline.  To 
their credit, macroeconomists and others have reacted to the crisis with a profusion of new 
research efforts exploring the workings of financial intermediation and asset holding, and 
investigating in particular the implications of a variety of “frictions” that intermediation 
inherently entails under conditions that obtain in any even moderately advanced economy.2  But 
there is no point of contact between most of this work and the standard workhorse models.  This 
gap in turn creates two parallel problems:  Students seeking to understand how one or another 
strand of this new research fits into the canonical macroeconomic framework they are learning 
see an unbridged chasm between two seemingly incompatible lines of thinking about what is 
clearly the same set of behavioral phenomena.  And, in contrast to earlier eras in the 
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development of macroeconomics (see Harry Johnson’s (1971) insightful essay), researchers 
seeking to establish the motivation for their work, among more than a narrow audience of fellow 
specialists, are able to appeal to what everyone has read in the newspapers but not to what the 
field holds out as the accepted conceptual overview.   
 One ready example of this divide is the behavior of central bank balance sheets, both 
during and in the aftermath of the crisis. As Table 1 shows, most of the advanced economies’ 
central banks responded to the crisis by rapidly expanding their balance sheets, purchasing assets 
in the open market and correspondingly issuing liabilities.  The Bank of England increased its 
balance sheet nearly five-fold, from £85 billion at the beginning of 2007 to £415 billion by late 
2012.  Both the U.S. Federal Reserve System and Sweden’s Riksbank expanded their balance 
sheets more than three-fold (although by yearend 2012 the Riksbank’s assets were back to only 
double what they had been at the beginning of 2007).  At the European Central Bank the 
expansion was nearly three-fold, and at the Bank of Canada nearly two-fold.  Among the major 
central banks, only the Bank of Japan increased its balance sheet during these years by less than 
fifty percent, but only because – in an example of the exception’s proving the rule – the BOJ, 
facing more than a decade of deflation and economic stagnation before the 2007-9 crisis set in, 
had already greatly expanded its balance sheet beforehand (but then shrunk it somewhat in the 
period just before the crisis set in).  By yearend 2012 the size of the BOJ’s balance sheet was 
nearly double what it had been in 2000. 
 Moreover, this radical departure in central bank asset holding was not just a matter of 
total quantity; the character of the assets these central banks held changed abruptly as well.  
Traditionally, most of the assets that central banks hold have been obligations of their own 
governments, and within those, mostly short-term obligations.  As Figure 1 shows for the case of 
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the United States, in the initial stages of the crisis – even before its balance sheet began to 
expand – the Federal Reserve massively (with nearly half of its asset portfolio) substituted loans 
to specific financial institutions for its customary holdings of U.S. Treasury securities.  When it 
then suddenly began to expand its holdings, immediately after the Lehman failure, it did so not 
by purchasing the usual Treasuries but by making more of these special loans.  It also began to 
purchase securities issued by private-sector borrowers: first commercial paper and then, in even 
larger volume, residential mortgages.  By mid 2010, mortgage holdings represented nearly half 
(47 percent) of the Federal Reserve’s entire portfolio.  As of yearend 2012, with the total balance 
sheet now at $3 trillion, mortgages still constituted 31 percent of total assets. 
 Why did the U.S. central bank undertake this massive expansion of its asset holdings?  
And what reason did it have for doing so primarily via loans to banks and then purchases of 
commercial paper and mortgages?  Why should an informed economist have expected these 
actions to affect either the financial markets or, more importantly, nonfinancial activity?  By 
what metric would one judge whether these actions were effective?  Students educated to view 
the macroeconomy and the role of monetary policy through the standard models have no way 
even to begin to pursue any of these very natural questions.  And the researchers who have 
pursued them have little way to connect their work to the conceptual frameworks that the 
standard models offer. 
 Analogous questions arise from looking at these central banks’ liabilities.  Central banks’ 
balance sheets, like those of other entities, balance.  The huge increase in asset holdings with 
which they responded to the crisis – see again Table 1 – therefore meant an equally huge 
increase in their outstanding liabilities.  Students taught to view the macroeconomy through the 
lens of central bank (or “high powered”) money supply would presumably have expected not just 
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an increase of a few percentage points in these economies’ rates of inflation but a massive 
inflation, perhaps even reminiscent of what occurred in Germany and Russia after World War I 
or in Hungary after World War II.  Indeed, more than a few economists predicted just such a 
consequence of these extraordinary central bank actions.   
 But at least as of the time of writing (yearend 2012) no such increase in inflation – not 
even a few percentage points – has appeared, in any of these economies.  (Nor did the increase in 
inflation that many observers had predicted earlier in Japan, when the Bank of Japan greatly 
increased its outstanding liabilities starting in the mid 1990s.)  To be sure, no one can preclude 
with certainty even that a hyperinflation, or something like it, may ensue some time somewhere.  
But even if inflation in these countries does pick up pace at some point, a response of some 
percentage points to this magnitude of increase in central bank liabilities, and only after a delay 
of more than half a decade, is widely at variance with the core implications of standard models 
relating prices to central bank money.  Given the huge magnitude of the expansion in central 
bank balance sheets, and in light of the weight that least-squares statistical methods attach to 
outlier observations, for the duration of the lifetime of today’s students no one will again be able 
to get economically sensible estimates, for any of the large high-income economies, from what 
were once standard regressions relating the price level (or its rate of change) to the quantity (or 
change) of central bank liabilities. 
 What economists and others interested in the workings of monetary policy now need, 
therefore, is a conceptual framework within which one can at least begin to ask questions like 
these – and within which the important research now under way addressing these questions can 
readily establish a point of entry.  The remainder of this paper sketches two versions of a simple 
model for this purpose.  Section 1 lays out a four-equation version, of which two equations are 
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identical to familiar elements of the currently standard “new Keynesian” model, one is a variant 
on what the standard model contains, and one is new.  The role of the new equation is to 
introduce explicitly the relationship between the policy interest rate that the central bank sets and 
“the” interest rate (a metaphor for a whole constellation of interest rates) that affects the 
spending decisions of households and firms.  Section 2 expands this four-equation representation 
to five, introducing an explicit supply-demand apparatus in place of the single reduced-form 
equation for the interest rate spread.  The discussion in each section uses examples of actions that 
many of the advanced economies’ central banks took during and in the wake of the crisis but that 
do not fit within the currently standard canonical models – asset purchases and forward guidance 
on the policy interest rate – to illustrate the workings of the model.  Section 3 briefly concludes. 
 
1.  A Four-Equation Model 
 The most familiar workhorse of monetary-policy macroeconomics today is the three-
equation “new Keynesian” model consisting of an aggregate demand equation representing 
consumers’ forward-looking inter-temporal choice for a given interest rate, a “Phillips curve” 
representing the forward-looking behavior of price setters operating under some form of 
impediment to perfect price flexibility (most typically, as motivated by Calvo (1983)), and an 
equation representing the central bank’s setting of a short-term nominal interest rate in response 
to observed movements of prices or output or both.3  The problem with this model, for current 
purposes, is not so much that it is wrong but that it is incomplete.  Once the central bank’s policy 
interest rate has reached the zero lower bound, the model implicitly portrays monetary policy as 
impotent to undertake any further economic stimulus.  It leaves no room even to consider the 
kinds of additional measures that many central banks undertook during and in the aftermath of 
the 2007-9 crisis. 
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 The remedy, therefore, is not to discard this otherwise useful framework but to expand it 
– while nonetheless preserving, in so far as possible, its analytical advantages in terms of 
parsimony and compactness.  The model’s crucial lacuna, for purposes of representing the 
actions of central banks during this recent period and their effect on the nonfinancial economy, is 
the absence of any distinction between the interest rate that the central bank sets – in 
conventional vocabulary, the “policy interest rate” – and the interest rates at which households 
and firms regularly borrow and lend, and that therefore matter for their spending decisions, either 
as direct costs (if they are borrowers/investors) or as opportunity costs (if they are 
lenders/savers).  The simple model suggested here fills that gap: in this section, with a single 
reduced-form equation directly determining the spread between the policy interest rate and a 
representative private-sector interest rate; and then, in Section 2, with a two-equation supply-
demand apparatus explicitly representing lenders’ and borrowers’ behavior in the market for 
private-sector obligations. 
 Two elements of the standard “new Keynesian” model suffice with no change.  Price 
setters behave according to   
 pit = E(pit+1) + βyt + ut        (1) 
where pi is the rate of change of the economy’s aggregate price level for goods and services, y is 
(the log of) aggregate output of goods and services, u is a disturbance term, and the equation may 
also include an intercept (not shown) so that y is implicitly measured around some equilibrium 
level that depends on the economy’s resources and technology.  And the central bank sets the 
policy interest rate according to 
 rt = r* + γ1(yt – y*) + γ2(pit – pi*)      (2) 
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subject to r ≥ 0, where r is a short-term nominal interest rate over which the central bank has 
control,4 y* is the central bank’s target level of output (presumably the level that would deliver 
stable inflation in (1), although for purposes here this need not matter), pi* is its target rate of 
inflation, and r* is the equilibrium value of r for given pi*.  Equation (1) is the consequence of 
dynamic optimization by price setters under any of a variety of well known conditions involving 
imperfect price flexibility (see again the examples in fn. 3), and (2) may be either the outcome of 
an explicit optimization by the central bank, given a quadratic objective (so that the resulting 
decision rule is linear), or merely a convenient rule of thumb that policymakers apply. 
 The third element of the standard model is necessary as well, although with an important 
change: 
 yt = α1E(yt+1) – α2(ρt – E(pit+)) + vt      (3) 
where ρ is the nominal interest rate relevant to private-sector spending decisions, E(pit+) 
indicates the appropriately averaged expectation of inflation over the horizon corresponding to 
the maturity for which ρ represents the private-sector interest rate, and v is a disturbance term.  
Here too the equation may also include an intercept (not shown), so that both y and the expected 
real interest rate are implicitly measured around their respective equilibrium levels.  Although 
many expositions of the standard model label the equation analogous to (3) an “IS curve” (see, 
for example, Clarida et al. (1999)), in its most common form the model includes neither firms 
nor investment and so the equation is not properly a Keynesian IS curve but simply the Euler 
equation for consumption that follows from households’ inter-temporal utility maximization.  
(The equation also often includes a term for government absorption of output, but the focus here 
is on monetary policy, not fiscal policy.)  The broader interpretation as a genuine IS curve fits as 
well, however, in that most familiar accounts of firms’ investment spending likewise imply a 
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negative elasticity with respect to the expected real interest rate, or cost of capital (although it is 
less obvious that a suitable representation of investment behavior grounded in microeconomic 
optimization would fit this simple functional form).  But regardless of whether (3) represents the 
behavior of households’ consumption or firms’ investment or both, the important point is that the 
nominal interest rate that matters for these decisions is not the policy interest rate that the central 
bank sets but instead some private-sector rate – ρ – that they would pay on borrowing to finance 
spending in excess of current income, or that they would earn on unspent income or other 
accumulated assets.   
 Distinguishing between these two interest rates means abandoning the assumption, which 
has been commonplace in standard macroeconomic theory ever since the inception of the field, 
that all non-money assets are perfect substitutes.5  Most central banks normally conduct 
monetary policy by setting an overnight interest rate, or if not overnight then for some other very 
short maturity: in the United States the federal funds rate (usually overnight transactions), in 
Europe the “EONIA” Euro overnight interest average, and in Japan the uncollateralized call loan 
rate (also mostly one-day loans).  By contrast, the obligations that either households or firms 
issue to finance their spending, and likewise the instruments in which households invest their 
savings, are typically of much longer maturity, often measured in years rather than days.  
Further, while the interest rates that central banks set for purposes of monetary policy are mostly 
for obligations that are implicitly guaranteed – often claims on banks’ holdings of reserves at the 
central bank itself – private-sector obligations are potentially subject to default.  On grounds of 
both maturity and default risk, therefore, the obligations respectively underlying the policy 
interest rate r and the constellation of private-sector rates that ρ represents are not perfect 
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substitutes when investors are risk averse.  Moreover, the difference, or spread, between the two 
interest rates can vary over time even if investors’ risk aversion is constant. 
 With the central bank setting r as in (2), but households and firms making spending 
decisions based on ρ as in (3), it therefore remains to remains to determine ρ for given r.  A 
simple reduced-form relation between the two interest rates that takes into account both the 
default risk on private obligations and also their longer maturity is 
 ρt = (1 - δ) rt + δret+ + ϕ(R/A)t + zt      (4) 
where ret+ is the policy interest rate that market participants expect to prevail on average in the 
future over the time horizon corresponding to the private security’s maturity, δ (0 ≤ δ < 1) is a 
parameter that reflects the maturity of the private security (δ = 0 when it is identical to the 
maturity corresponding to the policy interest rate), R/A is the ratio of risky to total assets that 
private-sector investors must hold for the asset market to clear, and z is a disturbance term.  The 
first pair of terms on the right-hand side reflect the pricing of long- relative to short-term assets 
according to the familiar expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates; writing the 
expected future level of the policy interest rate as ret+ instead of E(rt+) makes explicit that under 
circumstances like forward guidance provided by the central bank, investors’ expectations of 
future central bank actions need not be “rational” in the conventional sense of consistency with 
the mathematical expectation delivered by the model itself.6  The third term reflects the 
dependence of the market price of risk on the relative supply of risky versus risk-free assets that 
the market must hold; for given variance associated with the risky asset’s expected return, and 
given risk aversion of investors, the greater is the supply of risky assets in the total market 
portfolio the larger will be the market-clearing excess return on risky over risk-free assets.7 
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 Equation (4) introduces the opportunity for the model to incorporate not only influences 
of the kind that many observers have identified as proximate causes of the  2007-9 crisis but also 
key actions that many central banks undertook in response to it.  The disturbance z represents 
influences on the private-sector interest rate ρ arising from forces outside either the model itself 
or the actions of central banks.  Familiar examples important to the events of 2007-9 are the loss 
of value of borrowers’ collateral when house prices fell, and the reduction in capital of lending 
institutions due to loan losses.8  The term in ret+ introduces the opportunity to represent the effect 
of the central bank’s forward guidance on the future level of the policy interest rate.  (Doing so 
in this way also highlights the importance of the market credibility of that guidance: it has an 
effect only if investors believe it.)  The term in R/A introduces the opportunity to represent the 
central bank’s asset purchases; in buying private-sector obligations like commercial paper and 
mortgages, either in exchange for government obligations or by issuing its own liabilities 
(normally reserves), the central bank changes the risky/risk-free mix of the market portfolio that 
private investors in the aggregate must hold. 
 Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the workings of these new model capabilities that distinguishing 
the policy interest rate from the relevant private-sector interest rate, and relating the two via an 
expression like (4), make possible.  The downward sloping line labeled “IS” in Figure 2 plots 
output y as a function of the relevant (that is, the private-sector) interest rate ρ, combining 
equations (1) and (3) for given expectations of future output and inflation.  The horizontal line 
labeled “r” shows the level of the policy interest rate set by the central bank.  The horizontal line 
labeled “ρ” shows the value of the private-sector interest rate, given this value of r and also for 
given values of ret+ and R/A and an assumed zero realization of disturbance z.  The figure makes 
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clear that y is determined at the intersection of “IS” with ρ, not with r.  The figure arbitrarily 
portrays this intersection, marked as point A, at the full-employment output value y*.   
 Figure 3, in which the horizontal “r” line does not appear, illustrates the impact of an 
adverse shock to the pricing of private-sector credits – stemming from, say, a decline in house 
prices, or realized loan losses that deplete lenders’ capital, or even simply investors’ concern that 
the economy may be heading into a slow period in which private-sector borrowers’ 
creditworthiness will be under stress.  From (4), the positive realization of z raises ρ with all else 
equal; the movement from the solid to the broken horizontal line shows the resulting increase to 
a new, higher level of ρ for the same values of r, ret+ and R/A as before, and the intersection 
shifts from point A to B.  If monetary policymakers want to return the economy to the initial 
equilibrium at y*, therefore, they must change – specifically, they must reduce – one or more of 
r, ret+ and R/A.  (Alternatively, fiscal policymakers may take measures that shift the IS line 
outward; but the focus here is on monetary policy.)  Under conventional circumstances, when 
movements of the policy interest rate are not limited by the zero lower bound, the central bank 
presumably would choose to reduce r.  Again from (4), in principle it can fully offset the adverse 
credit market shock by cutting r by z/(1-δ).  If it does so, the resulting representation for ρ is 
once again the solid horizontal line, which is then conditional on initial values ret+,0 and (R/A)0 as 
before, but now r = r0 – z/(1-δ) to offset z > 0, and the intersection returns to point A. 
 For purposes of thinking about monetary policy during and in the wake of the 2007-9 
crisis, however, the policy interest rate was already at the zero lower bound and so further cuts 
were not an option that policymakers faced.  Many central banks therefore turned to (often very 
large-scale) purchases of private-sector assets.  In terms of equation (4), their doing so reduced 
R, the supply of potentially defaultable and also longer-term assets that the market needed to 
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hold, without changing A, the total supply of risky plus risk-free assets in the market portfolio.  
These asset purchases therefore reduced the relative supply ratio R/A, and hence narrowed the 
spread between the (risk-free) policy interest rate r and the (risky) private-sector interest rate ρ.   
 In terms of a richer model that would explicitly represent a multiplicity of different risky 
assets (that is, assets that are not perfect substitutes either for the risk-free asset or for one 
another) and in which R and ρ would therefore expand to a vectors of quantities and interest 
rates describing these distinct risky assets, specifically targeted purchases of a security like 
commercial paper or mortgages would reduce the  individual asset supply quantity to be held by 
private-sector investors Ri, and thereby lower the corresponding market-clearing interest rate ρi.  
As the two panels of Figure 4 suggest, and as detailed empirical studies have shown,9 the Federal 
Reserve’s purchases of commercial paper (at the peak, $385 billion) and then mortgages (at the 
peak, $1.1 trillion) – see again Figure 1 – had just this effect.  Similarly, a program like the 
Federal Reserve’s “Operation Twist,” which involved buying longer-term Treasury securities 
and either selling shorter-term Treasuries outright or simply allowing them to mature without 
replacing them, would reduce Ri and therefore lower ρi corresponding to the long-term securities 
while increasing Ri and raising ρi corresponding to the shorter maturities (if the shorter-term 
rates are not infra-marginally constrained at zero). 
 Figure 5 illustrates the working of this kind of asset purchase program, in its generic 
form, within the model.  Once again, the broken horizontal line labeled “ρ” represents the level 
of the private-sector interest rate following an adverse shock to private intermediation (z > 0), 
with r, ret+ and (R/A) all at their respective initial values, r0 (presumably = 0), r
e
t+,0 and (R/A)0.  
By purchasing risky assets, the central bank reduces R, without affecting A, so that R/A becomes 
smaller.  Following (4), ρ therefore falls, even for given values r0 and ret+,0, as indicated by the 
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dotted horizontal line.  If the central bank were to purchase enough of the risky asset in this way 
– specifically, if it were to buy z·A/ϕ of the risky asset – doing so would lower ρ enough to 
restore output to y*.  Figure 5 instead illustrates the more realistic case in which the central 
bank’s purchases fall short of this amount, so that y remains below y*, albeit above what y 
would have been without the central bank’s action; instead of returning all the way to point A, 
the intersection moves only from B to C. 
 A second policy tool to which some central banks turned in the crisis, in the absence of 
the ability to cut the policy interest rate any further, was forward guidance.  The Federal 
Reserve’s Open Market Committee reduced its target for the federal funds rate to 0 – ¼ percent 
in December 2008.  At the same time, it publicly stated that “the Committee anticipates that 
weak economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate 
for some time.”  Apart from a change in wording from “some time” to “an extended period,” the 
Committee repeated the same public statement after each meeting that it held through June 2011.  
In August 2011, it then switched to a more explicit statement that “the Committee currently 
anticipates that economic conditions … are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the 
federal funds rate at least through mid-2013.”  Thereafter, the committee extended the specific 
horizon for this forward guidance several times, by late 2012 indicating the anticipation of low 
short-term interest rates “at least through mid-2015.” 
 These statements, even in their later, more precise form, presented a difficulty of 
interpretation: were they promises? or merely policymakers’ expectations?  If they were 
promises, were they credible?  (What if, at some point between late 2012 and mid 2015, the 
economy were to show signs of a vigorous recovery?  Would policymakers leave the target 
federal funds rate at 0 – ¼ percent anyway?)  And if they were expectations, in what way did 
16 
 
they constitute an independent policy tool?  After all, policymakers’ expectations at any time are 
what they are.  In December 2012, therefore, the Open Market Committee shifted to a new form 
of statement explicitly conditioned on observed and forecast economic outcomes: “the 
Committee … currently anticipates that this exceptionally low level for the federal funds rate 
will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6 ½ percent, 
inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage 
point above the Committee’s 2-percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations 
continue to be well anchored.” 
 One way to view such a statement is as a publicly disclosed decision rule partially 
overriding the interest rate setting rule in equation (2).  An alternative interpretation is that, in the 
context of the same interest rate setting rule as before, policymakers were revealing their 
expectation that under the stated conditions y and pi would be low enough, relative to y* and pi*, 
that the value of r given by (2) would remain at or below the zero lower bound.  Either way, the 
relevant implication for the economy – as long as participants in the securities market take the 
statement to be credible – is as an influence on ret+ in (4).  Figure 6 shows that the effect of such 
credible forward guidance is analogous to the effect of central bank asset purchases as illustrated 
in Figure 5.  Here again the broken horizontal line labeled “ρ” represents the level of the private-
sector interest rate following an adverse shock to private intermediation (z > 0), with r, ret+ and 
(R/A) all at their initial values.  With ret+ < r
e
t+,0 due to forward guidance, the spread narrows and 
ρ therefore falls for given r0 and (R/A)0, as indicated by the dotted horizontal line.  Figure 6 once 
again illustrates the presumably realistic case in which the effect of the central bank’s forward 
guidance – which, like its actual setting of r, is restricted by the zero lower bound – is 
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insufficient to restore y to y*; once again, instead of returning all the way to point A, the 
intersection moves only from B to C. 
 
2.  A Five-Equation Model 
 The key addition in the model laid out in Section 1, compared to today’s standard 
workhorse model, is the interest rate spread relationship (4).  In contrast to equations (1) and (3), 
however, (4) does not directly represent the optimal behavior of any class of agents within the 
model.  It is instead a reduced-form representation of an economic outcome – in the market in 
which the households and firms whose spending decisions (3) represents issue, and risk-averse 
investors purchase, private-sector obligations.  Although the resulting four-equation model in 
Section 1 is sufficient to capture influences like declining house prices and lenders’ shrunken 
capital that were at work in the 2007-9 crisis, as well as actions like asset purchases and forward 
guidance that central banks took in response, explicitly representing the behavior of borrowers 
and lenders in the market that determines the key interest rate ρ can further clarify how these 
shocks and policy actions have their effect. 
 In an expansion of the spread relationship (4) that makes explicit the roles of the agents 
on the two sides of this market, households and firms borrow according to 
 cSt = ϕ1E(yt+) – ϕ2(ρt – E(pit+)) + zSt      (4S) 
where cS is the supply of private-sector obligations, and zS is a disturbance term.  
Correspondingly, private-sector investors – who likewise include households and firms within 
the economy,10 but perhaps also financial intermediaries as well as foreign investors – lend to 
households and firms according to 
 cDt = θ1E(yt+) + θ2[ρt – ((1 - δ) rt + δret+)] + zDt    (4D) 
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where cD is the demand for private sector obligations, and zD is a disturbance term.  Supply 
equation (4S) is the adjunct of (3) in a setting in which households maximizing inter-temporal 
utility of consumption and firms deciding on investment spending are not constrained by their 
current income and accumulated assets but also have the ability to borrow at nominal interest 
rate ρ.  The first term reflects the greater willingness to borrow when expected future income is 
higher, while the second term reflects the negative influence of the relevant real interest rate on 
optimal borrowing, all else equal.  Demand equation (4D) represents the optimal behavior of risk-
averse investors allocating their portfolios between private-sector obligations bearing interest 
rate ρ and the asset corresponding to the central bank’s policy interest rate, with return rt in the 
present and ret+ expected over the remaining maturity of the private obligations.  The first term 
reflects the improved creditworthiness of private-sector borrowers, all else equal, when their 
expected incomes are higher, while the second term results from the imperfect substitutability of 
the two assets in risk-averse investors’ portfolios.11  With households’ and firms’ supply of 
private-sector obligations as in (4S), and investors’ demand for these obligations as in (4D), the 
market clears when  
 cSt = c
D
t + c
CB
t         (4
MC) 
where cCB is the net purchase of private-sector assets by the central bank.12  
 Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the expanded model’s portrayal of an adverse shock to financial 
intermediation, followed by partially offsetting policy action by the central bank.  The 
downward-sloping IS line in the right-hand panel of each figure is again the relationship between 
spending and the private-sector interest rate, from (3), as before conditional on given 
expectations of future output and inflation.  The downward-sloping line in the left-hand panel of 
each figure, labeled “cS”, depicts households’ and firms’ supply of private sector securities, from 
19 
 
(4S), as a function of interest rate ρ and for given expectations E(yt+) and E(pit+) and zero 
realization of disturbance zS.  The solid upward-sloping line in the left-hand panel, labeled “cD + 
cCB”, correspondingly depicts investors’ demand for private sector securities, from (4D), as a 
function of ρ for given expectations E(yt+), given values of r and ret+, and zero realization of 
disturbance zD, and a given level of purchases by the central bank cCB.  Both Figures 7 and 
Figure 8 arbitrarily portray the initial supply-demand equilibrium in the asset market in the left-
hand panel (at point A) at the private-sector interest rate level that, when transposed to the right-
hand panel, intersects with the IS line at the full-employment value y*. 
 In the expanded model, either a decline in the value of borrowers’ collateral or a 
deterioration of lenders’ capital corresponds to a negative realization of disturbance zD to 
investors’ demand for private-sector securities.13  The result is to shift the demand curve 
backward for given values r0, r
e
t+,0 and c
CB
0, to the respective broken lines in the right-hand panel 
of Figures 7 and 8, resulting in each case in a higher market-clearing private-sector interest rate ρ 
and therefore y < y* (in both panels, at point B).    
 Figure 7 illustrates the effect in this situation of additional purchases of private-sector 
obligations by the central bank, so that cCB > cCB0.  From (4
MC), the central bank’s purchases are 
a straightforward addition to the total market demand for these securities, and so they shift the 
demand curve outward to the dotted line in the left-hand panel, thereby lowering the market-
clearing interest rate ρ for given r0, ret+,0 and zD < 0.  The result in the right-hand panel is an 
increase in y.  (Both intersections are marked as point C.)  As before, Figure 7 illustrates the 
presumably realistic case in which the central bank’s purchases cCB are not sufficient to restore y 
to y*. 
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 Figure 8 analogously illustrates the working of forward guidance on the future policy 
interest rate.  Reducing ret+ shifts the demand curve downward, again lowering the market-
clearing interest rate ρ for given r0, cCB0 and zD < 0, as indicated by the dotted line in the left-
hand panel of the figure, and raising output y in the right-hand panel (point C in each panel).  
With the linear demand curve assumed here, the downward movement due to ret+ < ret+,0 in 
Figure 8 is visually indistinguishable from the outward movement due to cCB  > cCB0 in Figure 7; 
but because of the interaction of ρ and ret+ in (4D), the movement due to changed ret+ is vertical, 
not horizontal.  Here too the figure illustrates the case in which the effect of the central bank’s 
forward guidance is not sufficient to restore y to y* – presumably because of the zero lower 
bound on r. 
 Finally, if the policy interest rate is not already at the zero lower bound, the central bank 
can achieve the same downward movement of the demand curve shown in Figure 8 by cutting r, 
rather than resorting to forward guidance to reduce ret+.  But the chief purpose of the model 
developed here is to facilitate analysis of the “unconventional” monetary policy actions that 
central banks took when – and because – reducing the policy interest rate was not an available 
option. 
 
3.  In Conclusion 
 The practice of monetary policy, as carried out by the central banks of the advanced 
industrialized economies, has changed since the 2007-9 financial crisis.  The analysis of 
monetary policy needs to change as well.  Monetary policy is no longer merely a matter of the 
central bank’s setting some short-term nominal interest rate.  Once they had cut their policy 
interest rates to the effective lower bound, during and in the aftermath of the crisis, many central 
banks pursued further measures like targeted asset purchases and forward guidance on the policy 
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rate itself, in both cases intended to reduce longer-term interest rates for private-sector borrowers 
and thereby stimulate nonfinancial economic activity.  The analysis of monetary policy needs to 
be able to accommodate these monetary policy actions too.  It is no longer sufficient to represent 
the central bank as having a single policy tool at its disposal. 
 The point is a fundamental one, in two ways.  First, for decades the common theoretical 
understanding has been that monetary policy has only one independent “instrument” (in 
Tinbergen’s (1952) vocabulary) at its disposal: it can set the quantity of its outstanding liabilities, 
or it can set their market price – that is, the interest rate at which they are exchanged – but it 
cannot independently set both.  In modern times, with brief exceptions, most central banks have 
chosen to carry out monetary policy by setting the interest rate corresponding to banks’ holdings 
of reserves held at the central bank.14  In their response to the 2007-9 crisis, most of the major 
central banks initially used the interest-rate instrument and then, once the policy interest rate had 
hit the lower bound, turned to the quantity instrument.  Viewed from this perspective, in each 
phase of the response to the crisis the central bank was, as in the traditional understanding, still 
using only one monetary policy instrument at a time. 
 But the ongoing discussion of monetary policy in the post-crisis recovery has made clear 
that, under arrangements now in place in most of the high-income economies – specifically, with 
the central bank able to pay interest on banks’ reserve balances – monetary policymakers need 
not deploy only one of these instruments at a time.  The central bank’s ability to choose what 
quantity of assets to purchase (with consequent increase in its liabilities), as many central banks 
did during and following the crisis, is not merely an artifact of the policy interest rate’s being at 
the lower bound.   Paying interest on reserves effectively established a floor to short-term market 
interest rates.  Importantly, it does so without the central bank’s needing to carry out 
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conventional open market operations; indeed, it can even do so while the central bank is 
changing the quantity of its assets and liabilities in the opposite direction to what would 
correspond, under the traditional theory, to whatever change in the policy interest rate it is 
implementing at the same time.15  Given today’s institutions, therefore, the central bank can 
choose both the quantity of its outstanding liabilities and their market price (that is, the interest 
rate at which they trade).   Monetary policy has not one independent instrument but two. 
 The second way in which the monetary policy response to the 2007-9 crisis has 
represented a fundamental departure is that the movement of central banks’ liabilities has been, 
in most cases, merely the passive (and, for macroeconomic purposes, mostly irrelevant) 
counterpart of the changes central banks have made in their asset holdings.  Policymakers’ 
decisions, and whatever economic effects have ensued, have been a matter of the asset side of 
central banks’ balance sheets, not their liabilities.   
 Numerous researchers have been actively engaged in seeking to understand, and where 
possible to quantify, the working of monetary policy within this new and very different 
theoretical framework.  The necessarily simplified conceptual framework that macroeconomists 
teach to students of the subject – and to which they turn in their own short-hand intuitive 
thinking – should incorporate this changed monetary policy landscape as well.  The simple 
model set forth here, in either its four- or five-equation form, provides a way of doing so. 
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Table 1   
  
    
  
Central Bank Balance Sheet Expansion, 2007-2012   
  
    
  
Central Bank 
Balance Sheet in 
January 2007 
Balance Sheet 
at Maximum 
Date of 
Maximum Multiple   
  
    
  
Bank of Canada $ 44 b $ 80 b March 2009  1.8   
European Central Bank € 1,154 b € 3,100 b July 2012 2.7   
Bank of Japan ¥ 113 t ¥ 158 t December 2012 1.4   
Riksbank kr 199 b kr 763 b July 2009 3.8   
Bank of England £ 85 b £ 415 b December 2012 4.9   
Federal Reserve System $ 910 b $ 2,979 b February 2012 3.3   
  
    
  
Source: Central banks as named 
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Figure 1: Federal Reserve Balance Sheet, January 2007 – March 2010 
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Figure 2: Determination of Income and the Private-Sector Interest Rate 
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Figure 3:  Effect of a Reduction in the Policy Interest Rate 
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Figure 4:  U.S. Interest Rate Spreads, January 2006 – December 2009 
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Figure 5:  Effect of a Central Bank Asset Purchase 
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Figure 6:  Effect of Forward Guidance on the Policy Interest Rate 
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Figure 7:  Effect of a Central Bank Asset Purchase (Five-Equation Model) 
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Figure 8:  Effect of Forward Guidance on the Policy Interest Rate (Five-Equation 
Model) 
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Notes 
 
1 See, for example, Brayton and Tinsley (1996), Smets and Wouters (2003) and Christiano et al. 
(2005). 
 
2 Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) from before the crisis, and Woodford (2010), Gertler and Karadi 
(2011), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011), Curdia and Woodford (2011), Choi and Cook (2012), 
Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012), Amano and Shukayev (2012) and Williams (2012), all from 
after, are just a few of the most prominent examples already in the published literature as of the 
time of writing.  The pipeline of current not-yet-published research inspired at least in part by the 
crisis is far larger. 
 
3 See, for example, Clarida et al. (1999).   As Roberts (1995) has shown, it is not necessary to 
assume Calvo’s specific form of price inflexibility to motivate the now-standard form of Phillips 
curve; staggered contracting, as in Taylor (1979), or quadratic costs of adjustment, as in 
Rotemberg (1982), deliver an equivalent expression for the behavior of the aggregate price level.  
Gertler and Leahy (2008) have shown that the familiar “S,s” model of pricing does so as well.  
 
4 See Friedman and Kuttner (2011) on what enables the central bank to do this. 
 
5 The introduction of private-sector borrowing and lending (beyond the mere existence of a 
market in which no one chooses to participate) also means that the model can no longer bear the 
interpretation of a representative agent: if all private agents were identical, there would be no 
reason for any one of them to borrow from or lend to any other.  But for purposes here, there is 
no need for a representative-agent model. 
 
6 An alternative way to represent this kind of forward guidance would be to posit that the central 
bank has adopted a new behavioral pattern to replace its historical behavior as in (2), and the 
purpose of the public announcement is to inform investors about this change. 
 
7 When investors have constant relative risk aversion, and believe that returns on risky assets are 
normally distributed, asset demands are linear in expected excess returns so that this relationship 
is linear as well; see Friedman and Roley (1987). 
 
8 Shocks to the credit market like a decline in borrowers’ collateral value or an erosion of 
lenders’ capital may also result in increased credit rationing – that is, borrowers’ inability to 
obtain loans despite willingness to pay the interest rate charged to similar borrowers who do 
receive loans.  The model presented here abstracts from such rationing, and therefore implicitly 
treats the spread (ρ – r) as a sufficient statistic for this influence on aggregate demand as well. 
 
9 See, for example, Gagnon et al. (2011), Hancock and Passmore (2011), Krishnamurthy and 
Vissing-Jorgenson (2011) and Hamilton and Wu (2012). 
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10 Here it is even more apparent that with private-sector borrowing and lending what results 
cannot be a representative-agent model. 
 
11 The linearity with respect to expected excess returns again follows under conditions of 
constant relative risk aversion and normally distributed returns; substitutability coefficient θ2 in 
(4D) is then directly proportional to investors’ total wealth (A in the corresponding reduced-form 
expression in the four-equation model), and inversely proportional to the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion and to the variance associated with the risky asset’s return.  See again Friedman 
and Roley (1987). 
 
12 For given initial quantities of private-sector obligations outstanding, and a given amount held 
by the central bank, cS, cD and cCB can be equivalently interpreted as either flows or stocks.  The 
market-clearing condition (4MC) makes clear that the model developed here abstracts from credit 
rationing; see again fn. 8. 
 
13 It is also possible to suggest ways in which a reduced value of borrowers’ collateral would 
depress cS – that is, would reduce the demand to borrow even if there were no change in lenders’ 
willingness to lend to them at a given interest rate.  But the effect on cD is more straightforward, 
and it is what the literature analyzing the 2007-9 crisis has mostly emphasized. 
 
14 One prominent exception before the 2007-9 crisis was the U.S. Federal Reserve’s experiment 
with a nonborrowed reserves operating procedure during 1979-82. 
 
15 See Friedman and Kuttner (2011) for a detailed discussion of this feature of monetary policy 
implementation. 
